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A Retrospective on the PATCO Strategy 
Abstract 
[Excerpt] The destruction of PATCO has been written off by most labor leaders as the inevitable result of 
an ill-conceived challenge to an anti-union U.S. President. Although there is widespread sympathy for the 
rank and file members who lost their jobs in an attempt to exercise collective bargaining rights in the best 
tradition of the U.S. labor movement, there is at the same time much disdain for the actions of the 
national officers of PATCO, most notably President Bob Poli. Although the criticisms of the officers are at 
least partially valid, it is important to recognize that the strategic miscalculations they made were by no 
means unique. It is even more important to give PATCO's leaders and members credit for the 
implementation of a brilliantly conceived internal organizing campaign. 
Critics of PATCO conveniently forget that it was a small union by AFL-CIO standards, with only 15,000 
members. Furthermore, the membership was scattered across the country in some 400 different 
facilities. Although the regional flight control centers typically employed 200 to 400 air traffic controllers, 
the majority of PATCO members worked in airport towers and belonged to small locals. Under the 
circumstances, preparing for a possible strike was a logistical nightmare. The legal prohibition of job 
actions by federal employees made the task all the most difficult. PATCO's ability to stage a strike which 
was supported by 75 percent of its members even after President Reagan's firing deadline had passed 
was a truly remarkable feat. Unfortunately the internal organizing consumed virtually all of the attention 
of the national officers, and the strike was lost because of flaws in other aspects of the union's strategy. 
PATCO's failure can be directly traced to the fact that its unsuccessful external relations were poor, and 
political activities were misguided. Another crucial weakness was a lack of understanding of economic 
factors, which led PATCO to overestimate its own strength. Because of the high visibility of the strike, 
these mistakes were magnified to such a degree that PATCO's officials were widely criticized (even within 
the labor movement) as bullheaded, inept, misguided, foolhardy, and worse. 
Because the flaws in PATCO's strategy are not unique, it would be a mistake to ignore the experiences of 
this feisty little union. In the discussion that follows, the various aspects of PATCO's approach are 
considered with particular attention to the specific lessons which can be drawn from the experience. The 
most important and least discussed contribution of PATCO was its internal organizing program. After 
reviewing the implementation of this most positive part of the PATCO game plan, the discussion will turn 
to the components which were not handled as effectively. 
Keywords 
Professional Air Traffic Controllers Organization, PATCO, labor movement, unions, organizing 
Disciplines 
Labor Relations | Unions 
Comments 
Suggested Citation 
Hurd, R. W. (1986). A retrospective on the PATCO strategy [Electronic version]. In A. B. Shostak & D. Skocik 
(Eds.), The air controllers’ controversy: Lessons from the PATCO strike (pp. 206-214). New York: Human 
Sciences Press, Inc 
This article is available at DigitalCommons@ILR: https://digitalcommons.ilr.cornell.edu/articles/898 
Appendix I 
A RETROSPECTIVE ON 
THE PATCO STRATEGY 
Richard W. Hurd, Ph.D. 
Associate Professor 
Whittemore School of Business and Economics 
University of New Hampshire 
The destruction of PATCO has been written off by most labor leaders as the 
inevitable result of an ill-conceived challenge to an anti-union U.S. President. 
Although there is widespread sympathy for the rank and file members who 
lost their jobs in an attempt to exercise collective bargaining rights in the best 
tradition of the U.S. labor movement, there is at the same time much disdain 
for the actions of the national officers of PATCO, most notably President Bob 
Poli. Although the criticisms of the officers are at least partially valid, it is im-
portant to recognize that the strategic miscalculations they made were by 
no means unique. It is even more important to give PATCO's leaders and 
members credit for the implementation of a brilliantly conceived internal or-
ganizing campaign. 
Critics of PATCO conveniently forget that it was a small union by AFL-
CIO standards, with only 15,000 members. Furthermore, the membership 
was scattered across the country in some 400 different facilities. Although the 
regional flight control centers typically employed 200 to 400 air traffic con-
trollers, the majority of PATCO members worked in airport towers and be-
longed to small locals. Under the circumstances, preparing for a possible 
strike was a logistical nightmare. The legal prohibition of job actions by fed-
eral employees made the task all the most difficult. PATCO's ability to stage a 
strike which was supported by 75 percent of its members even after President 
Reagan's firing deadline had passed was a truly remarkable feat. Unfortu-
nately the internal organizing consumed virtually all of the attention of the 
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national officers, and the strike was lost because of flaws in other aspects of 
the union's strategy. 
PATCO's failure can be directly traced to the fact that its unsuccessful 
external relations were poor, and political activities were misguided. Another 
crucial weakness was a lack of understanding of economic factors, which led 
PATCO to overestimate its own strength. Because of the high visibility of the 
strike, these mistakes were magnified to such a degree that PATCO's officials 
were widely criticized (even within the labor movement) as bullheaded, inept, 
misguided, foolhardy, and worse. 
Because the flaws in PATCO's strategy are not unique, it would be a mis-
take to ignore the experiences of this feisty little union. In the discussion that 
follows, the various aspects of PATCO's approach are considered with partic-
ular attention to the specific lessons which can be drawn from the experience. 
The most important and least discussed contribution of PATCO was its inter-
nal organizing program. After reviewing the implementation of this most 
positive part of the PATCO game plan, the discussion will turn to the compo-
nents which were not handled as effectively. 
/. Building Internal Solidarity^ 
In 1978 negotiations with the FAA, the only major improvement won by 
PATCO was overseas familiarization flights, essentially free trips abroad for 
members of the union. When the FAA failed to implement this plan because 
international airlines refused to honor the agreement, PATCO staged a series 
of largely unsuccessful slowdowns. Out of this experience came pressure 
from a group of rank and file militants to initiate changes within the union. 
In order to assure that future job actions would be supported by the 
membership, a committee was appointed in the fall of 1978 to begin prepara-
tions for 1981 when the next contract would be negotiated. The "81 Commit-
tee" had seven members, one appointed by each of the union's seven regional 
vice presidents. The members of the 81 Committee, known within PATCO as 
"choirboys," were chosen for their leadership skills, popularity with the rank 
and file, and willingness to commit 3 years to the nitty-gritty task of organiz-
ing within the union in preparation for a possible strike. 
The 81 Committee developed a strike contingency plan and explained it 
at regional meetings. Under the plan the union was organized geographically 
into 73 "clusters," with 1 to 12 locals per cluster. The idea behind this struc-
ture was to group smaller locals together with larger ones to reduce the feel-
ing and reality of isolation. The 81 Committee selected a choirboy for each 
cluster to implement the strike plan locally. Eventually additional choirboys 
were selected so that there would be at least one at each facility, or over 400 
nationally. All choirboys fit the same basic mold—they were organizers first 
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and foremost, popular with the rank and file, and committed to strike if nec-
essary. 
The 81 Committee instructed the choirboy in charge of strike prepara-
tion at each cluster to organize seven committees: communications, security, 
picketing, motivation, headquarters, good and welfare, and solidarity. In the 
smaller clusters every union member was assigned to a committee. In the 
larger clusters committee membership was often voluntary, but the broadest 
possible participation was encouraged. The cluster choirboy selected leaders 
for each committee, chosing individuals with skills appropriate to the commit-
tee's tasks, but with a commitment to strike if necessary as prerequisite. 
Although the 81 Committee did not specify the duties of the seven com-
mittees in detail, and as a result a fair amount of variability developed from 
one location to another, the general assignments were as follows: 
(1) communications—responsible for establishing a communi-
cation network locally (essentially a telephone tree), includ-
ing an elaborate callback system for disseminating secret in-
formation; 
(2) security—responsible for protecting strike headquarters 
from unwelcome visitors, keeping track of strikebreakers, 
and hiding the local president and choirboy in case arrest 
warrants were issued; 
(3) picketing—responsible for setting up periodic informa-
tional picketing prior to the strike, and staffing picket lines 
during the strike; 
(4) motivation—responsible for building support for the 
strike, and maintaining morale during the strike; 
(5) headquarters—responsible for locating an appropriate 
strike headquarters, arranging for necessary supplies, and 
staffing the headquarters; 
(6) good and welfare—responsible for helping members and 
their families survive during the strike, especially by di-
recting them to government agencies (food stamps, etc.) 
and charitable organizations; 
(7) solidarity—responsible for arranging social events for 
members and their families before and during the strike. 
In addition to the seven required committees, each cluster choirboy was 
free to establish additional committees. The most common addition was a 
spouses committee which helped build family support for the strike, and of-
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ten assisted other committees once the strike began. Some clusters also had a 
formal public relations committee and/or a political action committee. A final 
ingredient to the strike preparation plan was added by the 81 Committee as 
the strike deadline approached. In order to solidify the organizational struc-
ture and improve communication, the cluster choirboy selected an informed 
member from each work crew as an official contact. In some clusters these in-
dividuals were also referred to as choirboys. 
More important than the details of the committee structure or the duties 
of the specific committees was the opportunity provided by this system for 
rank and file members to get involved in strike preparations. The committee 
system in a sense democratized PATCO—there was extensive delegation of 
authority, and a noticeable increase in membership involvement in the union 
throughout the country. The spiritual effect of this change was captured in 
the June 1981 issue of High Cotton, the newsletter of the Memphis cluster: 
"The decision to strike . . . will not be made by a few powerful union officials 
in back rooms with under the table deals, nor was the Choirboy Program itself 
developed in that manner; but by us . . . the individual professional air traffic 
controllers of the United States. We are the people who work the boards and 
we are the ones who know best what we want and how to achieve it." 
The committee system was implemented in most clusters during 1980, al-
though a few did not get organized until early 1981. In addition to committee 
meetings (often weekly, and more frequent as the strike approached) there 
were monthly local meetings and quarterly cluster meetings. As the commit-
tee system built momentum, attendance at local and cluster meetings in-
creased dramatically. During the summer of 1981 there was a local or cluster 
meeting every week, and attendance approached 100 percent of those not on 
duty. 
Another key component of the 81 Committee's plan was a requirement 
that 80 percent of all full performance air traffic controllers, or approxi-
mately 90 percent of PATCO members, vote in favor of a strike. The feeling 
was that a strike could only succeed with near unanimous participation by 
PATCO members. With this 80 percent rule built into the plan, cluster choir-
boys established detailed monitoring systems so that they could accurately 
gauge the level of strike support. Members whose willingness to strike was 
suspect were given special attention, with a careful attempt to motivate rather 
than intimidate recalcitrant individuals. For example, black controllers in 
many clusters were only marginally involved in strike preparations. Visits by 
members of PATCO's national Black Caucus often won their support. In 
other cases older controllers near retirement who were PATCO activists 
talked with their contemporaries who were reluctant to support a strike. In 
addition to this one-on-one organizing, teams of PATCO members from 
highly organized clusters would visit clusters that had been less successful to 
offer advice and give pep talks to the membership. 
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Although the degree of organization and level of participation in the 
committee system varied from one area to another, the very existence of the 
committees assured high visibility for strike preparation and offered every 
member a chance to contribute. Most PATCO members took advantage of 
the opportunity, and spent much of their own time involved in union activi-
ties during the spring and summer of 1981. It was this high degree of internal 
organization that enabled the 81 Committee and the national officers to hold 
the union together in the face of President Reagan's firing ultimatum. Clearly 
the extensive internal preparation was highly successful. Other unions should 
take note of the methods used and do more to involve their members in 
union affairs. 
The only weakness in the 81 Committee's strategy was the exclusive focus 
of the cluster committees on strike preparation. The tight internal cohesive-
ness became so powerful that it developed a momentum of its own, making a 
strike almost inevitable. Had the same system been used to prepare for other 
aspects of the 1981 negotiations, particularly public relations and coordina-
tion with other unions, the chances of success would have been increased. 
//. External Activities 
A. Coordination with Other Unions. Although the 81 Committee advised 
locals to get involved in state labor councils, there was no formal system in-
stalled to assure that this happened. Some locals did establish links with other 
unions in their areas, but most paid far more attention to internal strike prep-
aration. Indeed, if the locals took the activities of the national office as an ex-
ample to emulate, little or no contact would have occurred. PATCO decided 
to wage its illegal strike with no prior official contact with the AFL-CIO or in-
dividual unions who would be affected by the strike. 
Communication with other public sector unions would have given 
PATCO leaders informed feedback on their planned course of action. This 
would have been especially useful given the general lack of experience of 
PATCO's national officials and the small professional staff of the union. 
Equally important, the larger public sector unions have extensive political in-
fluence which they could have used in PATCO's behalf. 
The failure of PATCO to communicate with airline industry unions was 
primarily an act of poor courtesy. Had the strike succeeded, thousands of 
union members could have been out of work for its duration. As it was, the 
reduced flight schedules which were imposed when the strike began gave the 
airlines an excuse to demand wage and work rule concessions from their em-
ployees' unions. 
All unions can benefit from cooperating with other labor organizations. 
For public sector unions such solidarity is crucial because of the strict limita-
tions placed on their activities by federal and state public sector bargaining 
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laws. With their own power severely constrained by legal restrictions on 
strikes, public sector unions should coordinate their activities closely with 
other unions to increase their leverage and bargaining power. 
On a positive note, an important improvement in AFL-CIO policy was 
implemented as a direct result of the PATCO experience. The Public Em-
ployee Department now requires advance notification 15 days prior to any 
probable strike by a federal, state, or local affiliate. The rationale for notifica-
tion is to improve the "quality and effectiveness" of "the support affiliated 
unions can give to and receive from each other during crisis situations."2 
B. Public Relations. To the general public, the PATCO strike seemed to 
be an example of another greedy union throwing its weight around without 
regard for who was hurt by its actions. The lack of sympathy for the strike 
stemmed in large part from the widely publicized PATCO demands, which 
certainly appeared to be excessive: a $10,000 annual pay raise (increasing the 
average salary to $40,000), a 32-hour work week, and full retirement after 20 
years on the job. Although this package might have been appropriate in the 
context of the posturing which accompanies contract negotiations, the de-
mands were extreme based on the work experiences of the average citizen. 
PATCO could have avoided a total public relations disaster simply by moder-
ating its demands and focusing more attention on nonwage aspects of the dis-
pute. 
PATCO had at its disposal ample ammunition for an effective public re-
lations campaign. Of particular relevance were the reports of two groups of 
outside consultants hired by the FAA to investigate labor-management rela-
tions, worker attitudes, job stress, and worker health in the air traffic control 
system. Both reports were openly critical of management practices. The 1970 
Corson Report could have been used in conjunction with the 1978 Rose Re-
port to demonstrate the persistence over time of management's inflexibility 
and insensitivity. The two reports were potentially valuable to PATCO be-
cause they provided objective evidence that the air traffic controllers had le-
gitimate complaints with management, and legitimate concerns with health 
related issues such as stress and burnout.3 In particular, this information 
could have been presented to the public to make an excellent case for a re-
duced work week and an improved retirement system. 
Although most unions could benefit from more attention to public rela-
tions, this is an especially important issue for public sector unions. Because 
their members directly serve the public, and because government decision 
makers must ultimately answer to the electorate, it is crucial that popular sup-
port be aggressively pursued. PATCO had a good case, but by waiting until 
after the strike began before going to the public it allowed the Reagan Ad-
ministration to set the framework of the debate. In fact, by reiterating its 
initial extreme bargaining demands when announcing the strike deadline, 
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PATCO played right into the Administration's hands. As Bog Poli later ad-
mitted, "Our own public relations efforts were about as successful as Qad-
dafi's."4 
C. Political Action. To its credit, PATCO recognized the importance of 
pursuing an aggressive political program. Legislation was introduced on the 
union's behalf in the House of Representatives, a coordinated lobbying cam-
paign was conducted, and an apparently sympathetic candidate for president 
was endorsed with much fanfare. Unfortunately, there were two flaws in this 
program, one of them fatal. 
First, the legislation was unrealistic and gave the opposition ammunition 
to use against PATCO. The combination of huge increases in salaries, future 
pay raises well in excess of inflation, reduced hours of work, and improved 
retirement made the proposal extremely expensive. When the Congressional 
Budget Office placed a $13 billion pricetag on the bill its defeat was guaran-
teed and PATCO's image as just another greedy union began to form. 
The second and fatal mistake was to trust the assurances given by Ronald 
Reagan in return for PATCO's support of his candidacy. The endorsement 
followed a private meeting between Poli and Reagan and a subsequent letter 
from the candidate promising to "work very closely with you to bring about a 
spirit of cooperation between the President and the air traffic controllers."5 
This campaign pledge was accepted at face value with no apparent consid-
eration given to the candidate's anti-union reputation. After taking office, 
Reagan reiterated his commitment to PATCO in a private February meeting 
with Poli, expressing sympathy for the air traffic controllers' desire for a re-
duced work week and improved retirement system.6 
While Poli was being charmed by the "great communicator," the real 
Reagan strategy was quietly taking shape. In February 1981, the Department 
of Transportation hired Morgan, Lewis, and Bockius to handle the expected 
"volatile contract negotiations" with PATCO. This anti-union law firm, well 
known to the readers of the AFL-CIO Report on Union Busters, was eventually 
paid $376,000 for services direcdy related to the PATCO negotiations and 
strike.7 In March, J. Lynn Helms was appointed FAA Administrator. While 
President of Piper Aircraft, Helms had personally coordinated campaigns to 
defeat union organizing drives in new plants, and to weaken locals in existing 
plants.8 
During the summer another ingredient was added to the Administra-
tion's strategy. An original strike contingency plan developed by the Carter 
administration was discarded because it was too restrictive. It was secretly re-
vised to allow for much higher levels of air traffic (approaching 75 percent of 
normal), more flexibility in scheduling, and more discretion for individual 
airlines regarding which flights to cancel. Airline representatives were in-
volved in the planning process, and the FAA was assured of their cooperation 
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in advance of the strike.9 The final ingredient was added to the formula 
when Reagan issued his firing ultimatum with a 48-hour time limit. Subse-
quently, 3500 members of the union elected to cross picket lines and return to 
work, assuring the success of the strike contingency plan and the destruction 
of PATCO. 
It is especially important that public sector unions recognize that their 
struggles may be won or lost in the political arena. The PATCO experience 
makes clear just how difficult it is to implement an effective political action 
program. Poli's apparent coup in gaining Reagan's assurance of cooperation 
eventually boomeranged. As should be obvious from what happened in this 
case, politicians who form an alliance based on the pragmatic goals of an elec-
tion campaign are less reliable than politicians whose personal views are con-
sistent with the interests of the labor movement. Furthermore, unions must 
be alert to the reality that the politician will become part of management once 
in office, and will inevitably view public employee unions differently than 
during the election campaign. 
D. Understanding Economic Factors. PATCO's leaders expected the 
strike to cause serious economic problems for the airline industry. If it had, 
there is little doubt that the airline companies would have pressured the 
Reagan Administration to settle the dispute. There were two reasons for the 
lack of significant economic impact. One was the revised strike response plan 
implemented by the Reagan Administration as discussed above. However, 
even this revised plan called for a 25 percent reduction in scheduled flights 
for an extended period of time. Such a major decline in business would nor-
mally be expected to be painful for any industry. But the airline companies 
were not operating in a "normal" environment in 1981. 
The industry had been struggling ever since the Airline Deregulation Act 
of 1978. Increased competition had resulted in more flights, lower fares, and 
more empty seats. As a result, the industry lost a total of $200 million in the 
first half of 1981 alone.10 Under the reduced mode dictated by the strike, the 
Airline Deregulation Act was essentially scrapped. The airlines were assigned 
quotas, but with significant flexibility to decide which flights got eliminated. 
The choice was obvious—nonprofitable routes were cancelled first. This en-
abled airlines to take inefficient aircraft out of service, save on fuel, lay off 
employees, win concessions from unions, and increase the all-important pas-
senger load factor (the percent of seats occupied). Also, with fewer flights 
available there was less competition for passengers, allowing the elimination 
of discount rates. The major airline companies, then, stood to reap economic 
gains in the long run if the PATCO strike was not resolved. And the beauty of 
it from their standpoint was that the higher fares, reduced flights, and layoffs 
could all be blamed on PATCO. 
PATCO's leaders had assumed that the strike would have a significant 
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economic impact. Any careful analysis of the economic conditions prevailing 
in the airline industry would have cast immediate doubt on that assumption. 
The lesson here is that unions must be willing to conduct appropriate analysis 
before planning a strike. After all, strikes are primarily economic actions. 
They are seldom effective except in an environment where the economic im-
pact is likely to be significant. 
///. Reflections on the Strengths and Weaknesses of the PATCO Strategy 
The leaders and members of PATCO deserve the highest praise for 
their internal organization. In spite of the geographic dispersion of the mem-
bership, an unprecedented degree of internal solidarity was cultivated by del-
egating authority and facilitating rank and file involvement. Every member 
had the opportunity to contribute, and most rose to the challenge. The AFL-
CIO has recently encouraged affiliated unions "to provide additional oppor-
tunities for members to participate in union affairs."11 Unions which take 
this charge seriously would benefit considerably from a careful review of the 
PATCO model. 
Unfortunately, the brilliance of the internal strategy was not matched in 
the union's external activities. It is incumbent upon union leaders objectively 
to evaluate the economic and political environment, and to offer an accurate 
assessment to the rank and file. Leaders should also coordinate with reliable 
allies to maximize potential strength, and communicate the union's just con-
cerns, grievances, and demands to the general public. In virtually every facet 
of its external affairs, the PATCO strategy was lacking. 
In the final analysis, however, most of the criticism of the 1981 strike is 
misdirected. PATCO represented the ultimate in union democracy, and its 
actions accurately reflected the frustrations of the rank and file. Strategic er-
rors were committed, but the air traffic controllers had legitimate gripes 
which were ignored by the Reagan administration. The goverment's hard 
line, noncompromising approach was unwarranted. The President chal-
lenged the pride and guts of an organization built on pride and guts. In the 
end a good union was needlessly destroyed. 
